I am an expert witness and consultant specializing in silica exposure, engineered stone fabrication and installation practices, OSHA compliance, and the real-world limitations of engineering controls. My expertise comes from more than 25 years owning and operating a high-volume countertop fabrication and installation company in California, where I grew a stone and quartz fabrication company, from a small operation with five employees to one of the nation’s largest providers with over 200 employees. I directly oversaw production, worker safety, engineering controls implementation, and silica exposure management.

Despite investing heavily in recommended control strategies—including CNC (Computer Numerical Control) machinery, wet cutting, local exhaust ventilation (LEV), dust extractors, shrouds, housekeeping programs, and PPE—I conclude that it is not feasible to consistently achieve compliance with the OSHA PEL of 50 μg/m³ for respirable crystalline silica over an 8-hour time-weighted average (TWA) during either the fabrication or installation of quartz or stone, even when recommended controls are in use.

This firsthand experience gives me a uniquely qualified perspective on the practical realities, failure modes, and feasibility challenges of controlling respirable crystalline silica during fabrication and installation.

Quartz manufacturers did not merely look the other way—they built a distribution system that guaranteed their products would end up in the most dangerous possible environments. Instead of restricting sales to trained, well-equipped fabrication shops with proper engineering controls, they sold massive volumes of engineered stone to third-party distributors who, in turn, knowingly funneled those slabs into small, unsophisticated “dry shops” that had no meaningful dust controls, no proper respiratory programs, and no understanding of the extreme silica hazards involved. Everyone in this supply chain knew the risks: engineered stone carries some of the highest silica content of any building material, and dry cutting it produces lethal dust concentrations. But profit took priority. Manufacturers and distributors alike chose to expand market share rather than safeguard workers, pushing product into shops that were fundamentally incapable of handling it safely. On separate occasions, I have personally spoken with executives from quartz manufacturers that confirmed this system. This reckless distribution model directly placed fabricators in severe, predictable danger—fueling the silicosis epidemic for the sake of revenue.

Today, I apply this experience to help attorneys and law firms understand what actually happens inside fabrication shops and installation worksites—and why many engineered-stone workers develop silicosis despite the presence of “recommended” controls.